Michigan Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 5

1958

Atomic Energy - Patents - Patent Aspects of Domestic Law,
Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Peter H. Hay
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the European Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter H. Hay, Atomic Energy - Patents - Patent Aspects of Domestic Law, Euratom, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, 56 MICH. L. REV. 770 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss5/5

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

770

MICHIGAN

LAw

ATOMIC ENERGY-PATENTS-PATENT

LAw,

[Vol. 56

REVIEW

AsPECTS

OF

DOMESTIC

EuRATOM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGEN-

CY-With the growing importance of atomic energy, conventional
legal concepts must be adapted and remodeled to fit new situations. In the area of patent law, the traditional notion that the
inventor's reward should be a legal monopoly in the invention,
in the form of a patent, has to be reconciled with the need for
wide dissemination of technical information. The need for se-
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crecy, for government control over weapons, and for cooperation
with other countries affects the atomic patent system. These factors are reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and in the
agreements establishing two international organizations concerned
with atomic energy: the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It
is the purpose of this comment to sketch some of these patent
provisions.
l. Patents in United States Atomic Energy Law
A. Domestic Law. The Atomic Energy Act of 19461 removed
from the patent system the broad areas of atomic weapons and
fissionable materials.2 In order not to discourage invention, provision was made for a statutory award to be granted by the Patent
Compensation Board of the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition, the 1946 act gave the AEC broad powers to declare in the
public interest a patent not within the above two areas and in
which the inventor would normally have had a patent monopoly.
The effect of such a declaration was to permit the use of the patent
by the government3 and by private licensees under section 7 of
the act. Theoretically, at least, these provisions were for compulsory licensing.4
The 1954 act5 revised the approach toward patents considerably; in fact, the patent provisions were among the ones most
strongly contested in Congress.6 The new law restored to the pat60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1801 to 1819.
See Ooms, "The Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act," 15 UNIV. Cm. L.
REv. 822 (1948).
3 This would have been possible anyway under 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1498.
4 Ooms, "The Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act," 15 UNIV. Cm. L. R.Ev.
822 at 830 (1948). In actuality, the application of the "compulsory licensing" provisions
of the 1946 act proved more limited in scope than those of .the 1954 act, if only for
the reason that no §7 license was ever granted under it. Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic
Power Development," 21 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 113 at 120 (1956). See generally Boskey,
"Progress and Patents in Atomic Energy: The Military and Civilian Uses," 34 TEXAS L.
REv. 867 (1956); Beckett and Merriman, "Will the Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?" 23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 195 (1954).
5 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§2011 to 2281.
6 Beckett and Merriman, "Will the Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?" 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 195 (1954). The
revisions in this area followed a message by President Eisenhower to "Liberalize the
patent provisions . • . , principally by expanding the area in which private patents
can be obtained to include the production as well as utilization of fissionable material,
while continuing for a limited period the authority to require a patent owner to license
others to use an invention essential to the peacetime application of atomic energy." 100
CONG. REC. 1924 (1954).
1
2
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ent system all inventions except those in the weapons field and
those conceived under Commission contracts.7 All other inventions employing fissionable materials were thus made patentable. 8
Another major change was to extend the provision for awards to all
atomic energy inventions upon application to the Patent Compensation Board.9 Awards, mere substitutes for weapons and fissionable materials patents under the old law, now provide supplementary benefits in other areas and thus supply added incentive to
invention by private enterprise.10 This added stimulus is important because of the amount of prior art kept from public disclosure
under Patent Office secrecy orders making the success of patent
applications at times doubtful.
Perhaps the greatest single change in the new law is found in
the compulsory licensing provisions.11 Alternative procedures are
provided, one by which the AEC can acquire a compulsory
license for itself with a right to sublicense and one by which such
a license may be acquired by a private applicant on his own initiative. In regard to the former, the tests to be met are stricter than
the comparable test of "public interest" in the 1946 act. There
now must be a finding that the invention is of primary importance for the production or utilization of fissionable material or
atomic energy. In order to obtain a sublicense under the compul7 As of November 26, 1957, some 1345 patents were held by the Commission and
available for licensing on a non-exclusive, royalty-free -basis. AEC, PROGRESS IN PEACEFUL
UsES OF ATOMIC 'ENERGY Uuly..Dec. 1957) 337 (1958). Some 680 licenses have been granted
to private industry. Id. at 173.
s Even an invention having both an atomic weapon application an!l a civilian use
is patentable, although only with regard to the civilian application. Boskey, "Some Aspects
of Atomic Power Development,'' 21 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 113 at 118 (1956).
9 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §157, 68 Stat. 947 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2187.
10 Proceedings before the Board are subject to judicial review so that, especially in
cases where the award is a substitute for a patent in the weapons area, the result will
be the same as if the owner would have ihad to proceed before the Court of Claims under
28 u.s.c. (1952) §1498.
11 A wide range of views on this subject was expressed during the debate. Hearings
before -the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862 To Amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 129 (1954). Compulsory licensing was
opposed because of its questionable constitutionality. Beckett and Merriman, "Will the
Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?"
23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195 (1954); comment, 43 GEo. L. J. 221 (1955). Small enterprises
opposed compulsory licensing arguing that the benefit of a patent monopoly under normal
patent procedures is the way by which ingenuity and initiative can offset the greater
financial resources of larger corporations. Karl P. Cohen in Hearings Before the Joint
Committee, supra this note, at 421. Yet the view prevailed that it would be beneficial
to retain some compulsory licensing features for a limited time. 100 CONG. REc. 14852 to
14873 (1954). The five-year limitation (to September 1, 1959) of §153(h) of the act was
put in by the House, over the Senate's preference for a ten-year term, probably yielding
to small business. 100 CoNG. REc. 12002, 12003 (1954).
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sory license acquired by the AEC, the applicant must show that
the license is of primary importance to his activities. Under the
alternative procedure, private applicants may acquire a compulsory license after a finding by the AEC that the granting of the
license is of primary importance to the furtherance of the objectives of the act.12 The fears of those opposing compulsory licensing
thus found satisfaction in strict statutory requirements. Moreover, the AEC appears inclined to exercise its compulsory licensing powers sparingly.13
In order "to keep the Commission fully and currently aware
of all technology in the field of atomic energy," 14 section 15l(c)
requires that all inventions be reported within ninety days. The
requirement is not new but constitutes a liberalization of the
sixty-day period under section ll(a)(3) of the 1946 act.15
Two major areas are inadequately dealt with in the 1954
act, viz., the problem of patents arising out of inventions conceived while under a Commission contract or other relationship
with the Commission,16 except if waived by the Commission, and
the problem of registration abroad of patents held by the Commission. As to inventions conceived while under Commission
contract or while maintaining a relationship with it, the language
of the act theoretically prevents the great majority of applicants
from obtaining a patent unless the AEC makes the admittedly
difficult decision17 to waive the government's interest.18 Absent
such waiver, the Commission's suggestion to a licensee concern12 The applicable regulations are: Commission-owned Hcenses: 10 C.F.R. (Supp.
1957) §§SI.IO to Sl.12; conditions with regard to licenses of patents, id., §§81.20 to 81.22;
patents not yet declared to be of public interest, i.e., compulsory licensing upon the
initiative of a third party, id., §§81.30 to 81.33.
13 General Counsel Mitchell of the AEC stated .that "The compulsory licensing provisions of §153 are deemed by the Commission to establish a reserve power. It is not
anticipated that this authority will be invoked except under compelling circumstances."
Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and
State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 194 (1955).
14 H. Rep. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 25 (1954).
15 Alternatively, the inventor may file a patent application rather than report in
which case the AEC will be notified of the invention by the Patent Office pursuant to
§15l(d).
16 Atomic 'Energy Act of 1954, §152, 68 Stat. 944 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957)
§2182. The underlying motive for the section was to prevent the 15,000 firms which had
been engaged in atomic work for the government from securing patents on inventions
conceived while in the government's employ. Address by Rep. Cole, reprinted in 100
CoNG. REc. A5858 (1954).
17 See statement by AEC General Counsel Mitchell in Hearings before -the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of .the Atomic Energy
Industry, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 197-199 (1955).
18 Legislative history points to ,the conclusion ·that the section was never intended
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·ing the feasibility of a project,19 or a letter addressed to the AEC,20
not to mention licenses, including access permits to restricted
data,21 may be relationships within the meaning of the act and
preclude private patent ownership.22 An additional shortcoming
of the act is its failure to give direction or encouragement to
the AEC in the acquisition of foreign patent rights on its own
patents. While an American manufacturer may find himself
barred from foreign markets because of the danger of infringement of patents issued abroad to foreign inventors, the filing of
patent applications abroad is left merely to the discretion of the
AEC in cases where it holds the patent right. 23 To remedy this
unsatisfactory situation it has been suggested that, short of repeal
of the atomic patent provisions in their entirety, the AEC should,
in all cases where it holds the patent rights but does not intend to
file abroad, grant the original inventor such an interest in the
patent as would enable him to protect his foreign interests by
filing an application.24
In regard to enforcement of the patent provisions, awards
may be denied for failure to comply with reporting requirements;211 for the same reason, access permits or licenses may be

to reach inventions under research or commercial licenses. 100 CoNG. REc. 13783 and
14344 (1954).
19 Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM.
PROB. 113 at 129 (1956).
20 Ooms, "Revision of the Patent Provisions-Good or Bad?" NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BoARD, CONFERENCE ON ATOMIC ENERGY IN INDUSTRY 279 at 284, 285 (1954).
21 Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB.
113 at 129 (1956).
22 Some, unfortunately not all, of these questions ~ave been solved, mainly because
of -the AEC's initiative. Thus, the AEC has determined that with the Access Permit
Program it may exercise waivers in advance. AEC, EIGHTEENTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 102
(1955). In its regulations, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1957) §§83.1, 83.2, it made extensive provisions
for waiver, reserving actually only the area of written agreements between the AEC and
third parties.
23 See Report of the Panel on the Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the
Joint Co~ttee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 2, p. 661 and vol. 1, p.
147 (1956).
24 WORKSHOPS ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1956, SUMMER INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, University of Michigan Law School, Workshop
V, p. 92. The AEC has recently stated that only 1% of the atomic energy patents are
under Patent Office secrecy orders, thus permitting communication of patents domestically
and the filing of applications abroad on 99% of the privately held patents. The AEC also
stated that it is filing foreigu applications for patents held by it. AEC, PROGRESS IN
PEACEFUL UsES OF ATOMIC ENERGY Guly-Dec. 1957) 173-174 (1958). The problems raised
by the omissions in the Atomic Energy Act in this area may therefore not be serious
for practical purposes.
211 See In re Grossman, Docket No. 7, 235 ATOMIC IND. REP. 641 (1955).
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revoked,26 a patent already issued may be invalidated,21 and criminal liability may be incurred for willful violation.28
B. Agreements for Cooperation. 29 The international activities
authorized by the 1954 act are generally conditioned upon conclusion of a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the
United States and a foreign nation.30 At present, some thirtynine such agreements are in force, of which twenty-nine provide
for cooperation in atomic research and only ten for cooperation
in the development of power.31 Four types of agreements should
be noted in connection with atomic energy patents: the broad
cooperative agreements for exchange of classified information
and reciprocal cooperation, such as the agreements with the
United Kingdom and Canada; 32 agreements for the development
of power involving communication of restricted data, such as
the agreement with Belgium; 33 power agreements involving unrestricted data, such as the one with Norway; 34 and agreements,
such as the one with New Zealand,35 providing solely for cooperation in atomic research.
The British and Canadian agreements distinguish unclassified from classified inventions and discoveries. In connection with
the former, provision is made for transfer by either party of all
26 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1957) §§50.100, 70.6l(b).
21 This question has not yet been litigated. See Boskey, "Some Aspects of Atomic
Power Development," 21 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 113 at 125 (1956).
28Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §223, 68 Stat. 958 (1954), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957)
§2273.
29 See generally Boskey, "Patent Licensing Problems in International Atomic Energy
Development," 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 554 (1957).
30 The Atomic (Energy Act of 1954 provides for agreements of cooperation in the
case of cooperation with other countries (§123), international cooperation in the restricted
data field (§144), and participation in an international atomic energy pool (§124). Provision is also made for "international arrangements" in §121 which do not require an
agreement for cooperation. An international arrangement within the meaning of the
act [§ll(k)] includes treaties and executive agreements approved by Congress.
81 AEC, TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (July 1957) cites, at p. 16, a total of
36 agreements in force. Since then further agreements were negotiated with Ecuador
[103 CoNG. REc. 7464 (1957)], Iraq [103 CoNG. REc. 7951 (1957)], Nicaragua [103 CONG. REc.
9240 (1957)], Brazil [103 CONG. REc. 12060 (1957)], Peru [103 CONG. REc. 11460 (1957)],
Spain [103 CONG. REc. 13776 (1957)]. An agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany
on Behalf of Berlin [103 CONG. REc. 9765 (1957)] was concluded after amendment of the
Atomic Energy Act. P.L. 85-14, Sept. 2, 1957, 71 Stat. 11. In December 1957, a total of
39 agreements were reported in force without, however, a listing of the particular countries. AEC, PROGRESS IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY (July-Dec. 1957) 190 (1958).
32 T.I.A.S. 3321 (1955), T.I.A.S. 3304 (1955) respectively. Also see agreement with
Australia, 102 CoNG. REc. 11430 (1956).
33 T.I.A.S. 3301 (1955).
34 103 CONG. REc. 2519 (1957). Its provisions in this area are the same as those in the
agreements with Brazil, Peru, and Spain, note 31 supra.
85 102 CONG. REC. 10403 (1956).
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rights to the inventions, discoveries and patent applications in
the country of the other, retaining only a non-exclusive, royaltyfree license. Two limitations should be noted: (1) the provision
covers only inventions employing information communicated under the cooperation agreement, and (2) the other government, its
agency or a corporation controlled by it, must own an interest
in the invention. Thus, individuals and private enterprises are
not directly affected.36 A further provision affords private parties
national treatment with respect to licensing under patents owned
by the other government in the latter's own country or in third
countries. While classified inventions are subject to all the above
provisions, the agreements contain additional provisions intended
to assure the continued secrecy of these inventions. Thus, it is
provided that no patent application containing classified information may be filed except under conditions mutually agreed upon.
This also applies to the filing of applications in third countries
not parties to the agreement.
The limited patent coverage of the Belgian agreement31 is
perhaps more typical of patent provisions in classified agreements.
In its Article IX it simply gives the United States all rights, in
its own country, in inventions made by any person under the
jurisdiction of the Belgian Government as a result of the communication of restricted data to the Belgian Government. This
covers inventions made while the agreement is in effect and in
the subsequent three years. No provision is made for a nonexclusive, royalty-free license for the Belgian Government in
this country, nor are there any provisions for an interchange of
patent rights. The reason for the different approach, and why
these provisions may be more typical than those in the British and
Canadian agreements, may be that it contemplates a unilateral
flow of information from the United States to Belgium rather than
being designed for cooperation on a reciprocal basis.
Power agreements involving non-restricted data, typical of
which is the agreement with Norway, 38 and the research agree36 As a caveat to the statement, it should be remembered that individuals could be
included indirectly. Thus if Canadian information is communicated to the United States
and -by the latter transmitted to a United States enterprise, an invention might become
United States property because conceived under a relationship with the AEC. Foreign
information transmitted directly to the United States enterprise may give rise to a United
States property interest if the invention is either in the weapons field or is made use of
under the compulsory licensing provisions.
31 T.LA.S. 3301 (1955).
38 103 CONG. R.Ec. 2519 (1957).
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ment concluded with New Zealand39 may be considered together.
Article III(c) of the Norwegian agreement excludes from its coverage all information which the parties are not permitted to
communicate because it is privately owned.40 The agreement with
New Zealand which expressly excludes the communication of
dassified data makes no mention at all of patents. Seemingly, the
explanation for their absence lies in the fact that inventions under unclassified information either have already been patented or
can be patented abroad when conceived by an American inventor. 41 In either case, American interests in such inventions would
be fully protected and would not require contractual safeguards
similar to those found in the classified agreements.42
II. The European Atomic Enerr;y Community (EURATOM)
The unique character of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), as an international organization established by treaty among sovereign states,43 whose member countries
retain all sovereignty except in the limited areas delegated to the
community, accounts for the complexity of its patent provisions.44
It possesses certain "supranational" features,4 5 exemplified by the
transfer of certain powers to deal directly with individuals and
is not limited to transactions with governments.
39 102 CoNG. REc. 10403
40 Strictly speaking, this

(1956).
article does not seem to add much since privately-owned
information and inventions could never have been communicated unless the government
first acquired an interest in them either by compulsory licensing or because the invention
was conceived under a relationship with the AEC. For the latter see note 22 supra.
41 The problems involved in patenting abroad by an American inventor of inventions
in which the AEC either has acquired an interest or which involve classified information
were noted earlier. Cf. notes 23 and 24 supra.
42 Two further international activities of the United States should be noted: Patent
interchange agreements were concluded [e.g., Turkey, T.I.A.S. 3809 (1956); France, T.I.A.S.
3782 (1957)] providing for exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense
purposes. These agreements were concluded under the United States Mutual Defense
Programs and expressly exclude atomic energy. However, one atomic energy patent exchange agreement was concluded between the United States, United Kingdom, and
Canada. AEC, TWENTY-FIRsr SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 104, 105 (1957). Patents developed
during wartime cooperation and owned by the three governments as of November 15,
1955 are covered.
43 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
44 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and
connected documents, Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market
and Euratom, Brussels (1957). The treaty went into effect January I, 1958.
45 Analogies can here ,be drawn to the supranational features of the European Coal
and Steel Community. In this context see Bebr, "The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Innovation," 63 YALE L. J. 1 (1953); MosER, Dm UEBERSTAATLICHE GERICHTSBARKEIT DER MONTANUNION (1955).
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, A. Acquisition and Dissemination of Information and Patents.
The provisions of the treaty dealing with the acquisition and
.dissemination of information and patents can generally be divided
;into three areas: (I) those dealing with the communication of
'information which is controlled by the community, (2) those deal·ing with the acquisition of information and patent rights by the
community, and (3) those dealing with the dissemination of information and patents so acquired.
Articles 12 and 13 of the treaty cover communication of information including patents, utility models and the like which the
.community itself owns, is contractually authorized to make available, or in the case of mere information, is otherwise free to disseminate. The community must make this information available
upon proper application. If information communicated to the
community was restricted as to dissemination because of its classified nature, the restriction must be observed by the community.46
The provision for acquisition of information by the com:munity concerning new patent applications, patents, and utility
models47 envisions the communication by the member state of
the contents of a patent application made within its jurisdiction
. (if the owner consents), or the communication of the existence of
·a patent application (if the owner does not consent to the communication of its contents). If only the latter is communicated,
the Commission, the community's executive organ, may require
the communication of the contents of the patent after a period
of eighteen months, thus, in effect, enabling the owner to de1ay
communication of the contents of his patent. In addition, member states are required to communicate unpublished patent appli'cations which do not deal with nuclear subjects but seem prima
'facie related. In such cases, the longer period of eighteen months
from the filing of the application is allowed ab initio. Communication of the contents of patents or patent application under these
rules does not entitle the community to make use of them, but is
only for the purpose of documentation. In order to acquire the
right to use, two alternative procedures are available. An owner
may use an "amicable arrangement" to communicate patent infor46 It should be noted that the last mentioned condition of art. 13 is reiterated in
art. 24 dealing with classified information. The main difference between the communication of classified vs. non-classified information is that the former may be communicated
~nly to a person or an enterprise which is not a "joint enterprise" as set up under the
treaty on the condition that the respective state is used as an intermediary. For "joint
enterprise" see note 49 infra.
47 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 16.
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mation to the community directly and to license it to make use of
the patent; member states and enterprises can use the community,
as an intermediary for an exchange among themselves. 48 Alternatively, the community can acquire the right to use, or to license
a third party to use a patent by means of compulsory licensing..
The provision for compulsory licensing differentiates between
the conditions under which the community or its joint enter-prises49 are entitled to compulsory licenses and the conditions
under which private persons or other enterprises may obtain like
licenses. In the former case, it need only be shown that the grant-•
ing of a license is "necessary to the pursuit of their own research.
or indispensable for the operating of their facilities." As to thesecond group of applicants, the requirements are more stringent..
There must be a showing that (1) the needs for nuclear energy in
the territories where the invention is protected have not been met,
(2) that the owner of the patent has himself, or through his licensees, failed to remedy those needs, and (3) that the applicant·
would be able to fulfill those needs if granted a compulsory
license.50 As an important difference from the American system,
the granting of a compulsory license to a third party:i1 is thus
made a matter of strict necessity~ with the needs of the nuclear
economy, as opposed to the needs of the applicant, the vital'
factor. 52
The mechanics of the compulsory licensing process are extremely complicated. After the Commission has notified the pat-·
ent ownet' 3 of its election to exercise its compulsory licensingpowers,54 two courses of action are open to the owner. He may
propose a "compromise," which means a referral of the case tor
an arbitration committee. 55 Alternatively the owner may refuse
48 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 15.
49 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 17. A

"joint enterprise" is an enterprise set up by the
Community and enjoys independent international status within the community. Treaty,
note 44 supra, arts. 45 to 51.
50 Furthermore, if the patent be one not specifically involving a nuclear invention;,
two years must have elapsed before a compulsory license can ,be issued.
51 A "third party" includes those enterprises not set up by the community, and
private persons in the member states; ·this constitutes an analogy to the third party in
the American compulsory licensing system.
52 Licenses are on a non-exclusive, royalty-free ·basis just as in .the American system..
53 The mechanics for the grant or acquisition of a compulsory license are set forth
in arts. 18 to 23 of ·the treaty, note 44 supra.
1
54 The conditions for compulsory licensing are set out in art. 17 of the treaty, note
44 supra.
.
55 The "compromise" is provided for by art. 20, .the Arbitration Committee by art:
18 of the treaty, note 44 supra.
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to invoke the arbitration process, thereby forcing the community
to apply to the owner's government for the license. In the former
case, the arbitration committee will have power to inquire whether the request of the Commission is in conformity with the compulsory licensing provisions. The decisions of the committee are
final and have the force of res judicata unless appealed to the
Court of Justice within one month. Here, the review power of
the court is more limited than when reviewing decisions of the
Commission with respect to granting licenses for the use of its
-own information. While in the latter case the court has "full
jurisdiction" to review the decision,56 it is restricted to a review
of the "regularities of form" and the "interpretation given . . . to
the provisions of this Treaty" when decisions of the arbitration
committee are appealed.57 The explanation seemingly lies in the
fact that in the one case the Commission is an interested party
while in the compulsory licensing case the owner and the Commission have previously been heard by an impartial body, the
arbitration committee. Therefore, only the regularity of the administrative process need be reviewed. Where the owner refuses
to permit arbitration or fails to invoke the arbitration provisions,
the Commission may apply to the owner's state for the license. A
hearing is required, 58 to be conducted by the member state, as
to compliance with compulsory licensing provisions. The action
of the state, both its refusal or its grant of the license, as well as
its inaction may be appealed to the Court of Justice. Here, jurisdiction is broader than in the case of review of decisions of the
arbitration committee.50 Arbitration is compulsory for the Commission or the third party applying for a compulsory license.

56 Treaty,
57 Treaty,
58 Treaty,

note 44 supra, art. 144.
note 44 supra, art 18, 1[2.
note 44 supra, art. 21, 1[2. It is interesting that the procedure provides for
a utilization of the member state as an intermediary for the enforcement of requests of
the Commission with respect to the communication of information and the granting
of compulsory licenses. This is especially true in the case of an owner's refusal to
submit .to arbitration. The only case of direct enforcement is in the case of an award
by the arbitration committee which, if not appealed, is directly enforceable under art.
164 of the treaty. When compared with the Coal and Steel Community, these provisions
show less "supranationality" unless the acts of the arbitration committee be equated with
the ordinary acts of the Commission and the phenomenon of the utilization of national
enforcement procedures be explained .by the analysis made earlier, viz., that the community is an interested party.
59 This follows ·by implication from art. 21, 1[5 of the treaty which gives the court
jurisdiction to review the case with respect to the .fulfilment of the conditions of arL 17
rather than restricting it to the review of ·the "regularities of form." The reason is again
the need for a more searching review of the decisions of an interested party.
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Once compulsory licensing has been decreed under either of
two alternative procedures, the owner is entitled to "full compensation."60 The meaning of "full compensation" presents an interesting question. The American law provides for "reasonable compensation" in the case of compulsory licensing61 and for "just
compensation" in the case of inventions in the weapons field. 62
Thus, while the American act distinguishes a taking (in the
weapons area where no patent can be obtained) from the mere
reduction of patent benefits (in the case of compulsory licensing),
the EURATOM treaty speaks of "full compensation." This,
semantically, suggests compensation for a taking in a situation of
mere compulsory licensing. 63 Procedurally, ample provision is
made to insure proper determination of full compensation.
Should the parties fail to agree, resort may be had to the arbitration committee. The committee award is appealable to the court,
again only on the limited grounds of irregularities of form or
misinterpretation of the treaty. Should the court's judgment be
unacceptable to the owner, the amount of compensation is to be
determined by competent national agencies of the member states. 64
Furthermore, the decision of the agency or the arbitration committee is subject to revision after one year, if new facts 65 justify it.
B. Provisions Concerning Security Safeguards. A member
state communicating the existence or contents of a patent application may request a particular security classification which will
be automatically applied to the invention. 66 Such inventions are
still subject to use, either with the consent of the owner or under
the compulsory licensing system, with the qualification that the
consent of the particular member state must be obtained. Consent
60 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 17(3).
61Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §157(c)(l), 68 Stat. 947, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957)
§2187(c)(I).
62 Id., §157(c)(2).
63 As a caveat it should be pointed out that the American distinction may be based
on tlie particular coverage of ·that act, viz., weapons and compulsory licensing, so that the
distinction perhaps should not be carried over into :the interpretation of the EURATOM
Treaty. Moreover, the term "full compensation," though contained in the official translation, is not contained in the original text of the treaty which speaks of "pleine indemnite."
64 In connection with the considerations raised in note 58 supra, it is interesting to
note that the court's determination is not finally binding on the owner in the area of
compensation, again an indication of the less than supranational character of this treaty
in comparison with that of the Coal and Steel Community. Considerations in this area
may, of course, be the greatly diversified national patent laws which national jealousy
did not permit .to be harmonized.
65 E.g., new economic circumstances or radically changed nuclear technology.
66 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 16.
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may be refused only for reasons of national defense. 67 The Commission is charged with the responsibility of developing a security system to safeguard classified information. In recognition of
the community's interest in inventions, the classification may be
changed by the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers and
upon advice of the Commission. 68 In return for the availability of
classified patents, the community assumes liability for any damage
arising out of improper use or communication to unauthorized
third persons.69
C. The Community's Interest in the International Agreements
of Members. A distinction must be dra,vn between international
agreements of the member states already in existence on the effective date of the treaty and those concluded thereafter. As to
the former, no communication of patents need be made to the
Commission if an agreement with a third country or an international organization precludes it.70 Indeed, no member state
may invoke the treaty in order to evade international obligations
undertaken prior to the signing of the treaty. 71 In order to harmonize and centralize existing international agreements, member
states are urged to negotiate with their treaty partners in an effort
to cause a transfer of the rights and obligations under the agreements to the community.12 Such a process would ordinarily bring
about a new agreement consented to by the original parties and
a qualified majority vote of the community's council of ministers.

67 These provisions are of great importance inasmuch as t:he treaty does not specifical•
ly exclude weapons from the general area of atomic energy covered. Absent the above
provision, national defense programs (such as .the French nuclear defense program) would
be endangered.
68 Where the owner has ·been prejudiced by .the classification or by a change of
classification, art. 27 provides for compensation according to the laws of the member
states. This is also true if the owner, under art. 26, is prevented from filing his patent
outside tlie community. These compensation provisions are not applicable .to the community itself and patents owned -by it.
69 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 28.
70 Bilateral agreements entered into by the United States with the six !European
countries after the signing and before the effective date of EURATOM commonly provide
for such prospective transfer under certain conditions. See Article II of the Agreement
with Germany, 103 CONG. REc. 9871 at 9873 (1957).
71 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 105, 1Jl. Conversely, art. 105, 1J2 provides that the
international obligation shall not be used to evade the Treaty if it was undertaken
between the signing and the ratification of the Treaty. In the light of some European
opposition to EURATOM, tliis provision was probably designed to curb a possible
flourishing of bilateral agreements which could later be asserted against the treaty.
72 Needless to say an international obligation undertaken before the signing of the
treaty will continue -to take precedence over it under art. 105, 1Jl if no agreement can
be reached whereby the rights and obligations are assumed by the community.
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Future international agreements between member states and
third countries or international organizations in the field of atomic
energy will be concluded by the Commission. Alternatively, the
Commission may authorize the member state to conclude the
agreement itself,73 subject to the approval of the Commission.u
The scope of the Commission's inquiry apparently is confined to
the question whether the proposed agreement comports with the
treaty. Its determination, like the decisions of the arbitration
committee, is subject to limited review by the court.

III. The International Atomic Energy Agency75
Under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
member states "shall" make available information acquired as a
result of assistance rendered by the agency; furthermore, they
"should" make available any other information they deem "helpful" to the agency. 76 Information so acquired, as well as information developed by the agency itself, must be made available
to other members. No provision is, made in the article requiring
the agency to make information available77 for the protection of
the agency's patent interests in inventions developed with the information so communicated. Apart from the preceding requirements, the agency can furnish information as part of the assistance
rendered by it under the "Agency Projects." 78 "Project Agreements" are required to contain a patent clause whereby the assisted country recognizes the agency's and the members' interest
in patents resulting from the assistance rendered. 79 In order to
73 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 29. This is also applicable .to contracts between the
member states and nationals of a third country.
74 Treaty, note 44 supra, art. 103. Arts. 29 and 103 are probably the only provisions
in any international agreement whereby sovereign states virtually relinquish their right
to conduct foreign relations, even if only in the limited area of atomic energy. This
phenomenon is not paralleled •by the otherwise more supranational Coal and Steel Community which can conclude agreements only for itself (not for the member states), as
it did in the Agreement of Association with the United Kingdom.
75 The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is contained in
IAJ!.A/CS/13, Nov. I, 1956. For a discussion of the statute, see Bechhoefer and Stein,
"Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic Energy Agency," 55 ,MICH. L. REv.
747 (1957). The United States joined the agency by passing the International Atomic
Energy Agency Participation Act, P.L. 85-177, 71 Stat. 453 (1957).
76 Statute, note 75 supra, art. VIII(B) and (A), respectively.
77 Statute, note 75 supra, art. VIII(C).
78 Agency Projects, provided for by art. XI of the statute, are projects whereby the
agency renders assistance, or arranges for assistance to member states seeking it in regard
to fissionable materials, and other "services."
79 Statute, note 75 supra, art. XI(F)(5).
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explain more fully these two alternative modes of communication
of information and the patent questions arising therefrom, analysis must proceed in terms of the different sources of the information eventually supplied by the agency to the inventor country.
A. Information Communicated by Member States. Three
distinct situations can be recognized here: information supplied
voluntarily under Article VIII(B) which is also generally available; information supplied voluntarily under Article VIII(B)
but supplied specially to the agency; and information supplied
under the requirement to supply information resulting from
assistance rendered by the agency.
Where the agency is provided information generally available,
such as a scientific publication, the agency apparently does not
acquire an interest in patented inventions conceived by a country
to which it passed on the information, since the information could
have been obtained elsewhere. Where information is voluntarily
supplied by a, member state, but under a special relationship with
the agency, it seems probable that the communicating country
will attach conditions to the dissemination, thus protecting its
patent interests. Where it does not, the agency itself can probably
attach such conditions in spite of its unqualified duty to make
information available. This would seem so because the duty to
make "available" need not be interpreted as a duty to allow the
"use." Furthermore, the agency could communicate such information under a project agreement in which case the statute calls
for the inclusion of a clause protecting the agency's patent interests. 80 The difficulty here is that it would be necessary to interpret the word "services" in the project agreements81 to include
"information." 82
Where information or patents are supplied to the agency
under a member's duty to make available all information and
patents resulting from agency assistance, the agency's duty to
make information available again cannot be interpreted to require
authorization to use such information or patents. On the contrary, it would seem that the agency becomes the owner of patents
so communicated; its duty to make information available would
then at most be a duty to make known the existence of the patent,
80Ibid.
81 Statute, note 75 supra, art XI(A) and (C).
82 This problem is also raised by Bechhoefer and Stein, "Atoms for Peace: The New
International Atomic Energy Agency," 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 747 at 770, note 98 (1957), with
regard to ,the interpretation of "services" in art. Xl(F)(3).

1958]

COMMENTS

785

the use of which may be licensed under conventional processes of
patent law. The only possible qualification is that the agency may
have a duty to grant licenses, though there seems to be no reason
to require that such a license should be royalty-free.
B. Information Originating with the Agency. When information originates with the agency, the situation is virtually the
same as when information is voluntarily communicated to the
agency without protective conditions attached and is passed on by
the agency to an inventing country. Again the situation is one
where dissemination must be made by virtue of the requirement
to make information available, with no provision for the inclusion
of a patent clause. Again, it seems that the agency's duty to make
available is not so far-reaching as to require authorization to make
use of the information. The agency should therefore be able to
attach conditions to any communication it makes. Alternatively,
it should be able to communicate the information pursuant to a
project agreement and be protected by the latter's patent clause,
as previously discussed.
·
Reasons for the very general treatment of the problems of information and patents in the statute, as compared to the farreaching activities and powers of the EURATOM Commission,
can be found in the different position occupied by the agency
with regard to member states as well as in the fact that the safeguarding of patent interests can largely be handled contractually.
Perhaps the basic reason, however, was a desire to leave the statute
as free from details as possible, thus leaving greater freedom for
policy shaping with the agency's board of governors which is
composed of the atomically most advanced countries.83

Conclusion
The above examination indicates the EURATOM provisions
to be the most complicated in the field of atomic energy patents.
The explanation lies in the nature of the community as an international organization composed of sovereign states. Like the
American law, it relies on compulsory licensing to satisfy the need
for dissemination of atomic information and patents, and thus
cuts down on the conventional patent monopoly accorded inventors. Compared with the American law and EURATOM, the In-

83 See Bechhoefer and Stein, "Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic
Energy Agency," 55 MICH. L. REv. 747 at 750, note 23 (1957).
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,ternational Agency has only very general provisions. This may be
explained both by the fact that policy decisions were to be left
.to the board of governors, with the drafters of the statute only
providing the framework, as well as by the fact that much of the
agency's activity will be as an intermediary between states. The
patent problem can thus often be handled contractually.
In the field of United States international activities, patent
.provisions are, for practical purposes, found only in the bilateral
·agreement for cooperation in the field of power development
when classified data are communicated. They are not found in
,the unclassified power or the research agreements.
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